Each of these models demonstrates a different approach to Muslim Personal Laws.
Section three below will discuss Ayelet Shachar's models of multiculturalism and also some consequences that have arisen in a few Asian and African countries which have adopted Muslim Personal Laws.
As a consequence of receiving numerous concerns relating to the SALRC Bill, which revolved around both constitutionality issues generally and women's right to equality in particular, the Parliamentary Office of the South African Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) drafted an alternative draft bill in October 2005. This Bill, called the Recognition of Religious Marriages Bill (hereinafter referred to as the CGE bill), was produced with the assistance of the office of the State Law Advisor, and was in fulfillment of the CGE's constitutional mandate. 2 This is a secular bill, of general application, that provides for the recognition of all religious marriages and avoids issues of codification of specific religious tenets, so as to comply with both international and constitutional law imperatives. It also addresses the lacuna that exists with respect to the non-recognition of other religious marriages.
The CGE Bill was discussed with the SALRC and then handed over to the relevant executive structures. The hope was that broad public consultations would be held by them, particularly by the Gender Directorate of the Department of Justice. But neither the Ministry of Justice nor the Ministry of Home Affairs has acceded to numerous requests for a meeting with the CGE, nor have they undertaken any public consultations on the CGE Bill. The most recent development has been the discussion of potential litigation, to challenge the unconstitutionality of non-recognition of marriages conducted under Muslim laws. 3 In assessing the best approach to the problem of non-recognition of religious marriages, the South African constitution must be interpreted in its historical context, i.e. by focusing on fundamentally reversing the effects of racial and gender discrimination that existed under apartheid. The constitutional mandate is transformative justice and hence the goal is substantive equality, not just formal equality. 4 The centrality of equality is reflected in the fact that the Constitution sets forth human dignity, equality, and non-sexism as foundational values. 5 South Africa's courts have stressed that this history of discrimination and the push to remedy the real-world impact of such wrongs must inform any interpretation of the Constitution, especially the provisions on equality. 6 Taking all these factors into account, this report attempts to set out the applicable international and constitutional law obligations; the relevant domestic jurisprudence that is of persuasive value; and, finally examines a few sections of both draft Bills. The relevant sections that are examined, relate broadly to the achievement of the rights to substantive gender equality, freedom of religion and access to justice. academics, community members, and government officials; and participation in a seminar with staff of the CGE. For the purposes of the latter seminar, the students engaged in an indepth discussion on comparisons that reflected their analysis of the differences and also the implications of both the Bills. †
2) Methodology
The findings and debates emanating from the desktop research and the field-work are reflected in this report. This report will be shared with the CGE and with relevant civil society organizations. It is hoped that it will be used for the purposes of advocacy at both the legislative and litigation levels, in respect of the promulgation of constitutionally sound legislation which recognizes all religious marriages, without violating women's human rights. This report uses the term Muslim Personal Laws to refer to personal status laws emanating from the tenets of Islamic religious sources.
3) Models of multiculturalism

General
This section largely draws on the work of Ayelet Shachar, who distinguishes between two different models of multiculturalism: the religious particularist model and the secular absolutist model. The 'religious particularist model' is a governance model in which different religious communities are vested with legal power over their members' personal statuses. 7 This model addresses the problem of respecting cultural differences by granting religious communities the authority to follow their own traditions in the family law arena.
Communities are vested with legal power over matters of personal status and property relations, and the state does not regulate citizens' marriage and divorce affairs. 8 The second model, the 'secular absolutist model' is a system in which the state retains authority over family law matters and all citizens are subject to a uniform secular family law.
Under the secular absolutist model, the state defines legally what constitutes the family and regulates its creation and dissolution. A uniform secular state law is imposed upon all citizens in family law matters, regardless of those citizens' group affiliation(s). Religious officials have no prescribed role in defining or celebrating marriages. 9 In its ideal form, the † The speakers and focus of each presentation at the workshop included: Elodie Moser -"Multiculturalism and Legal Systems -Models at Work"; Nazia Yusuf Izuddin -"A Comparative Analysis of Muslim Personal Law in Africa and Asia: Indicators for the South African Bill"; and Erica Westenberg -"Constitutional Analysis of Proposed Muslim Marriages Act". Mujon Baghai and Yvonne Osirim contributed to the desk-top research which informed sections of the presentations. secular absolutist model denies legal recognition for a marriage or divorce performed by a representative of a religious family law tradition. It also refuses to acknowledge the possible distributive aspect of religious family law traditions. In other words, the state does not allocate any legal authority to the groups over issues of status or property relations, preserving for itself the ultimate regulatory power over the citizenry in matters of marriage and divorce.
In theory, the key apparent advantage of the secularist absolutist model is that it creates a legal regime in which the state has a hold over all ministers, which then avoids the claim that "… the state only supports the practices of the majority [population] give the impression of certainty as to response and broad consensus on the issues, they have also evolved into controversies concerning which religious school of interpretation prevails.
The criticism is that giving legitimacy to one school of interpretation excludes the beliefs and rights of people who adhere to a different school, and this exclusion amounts to discrimination on the basis of religious belief. In the South African scenario, the SALRC bill is vulnerable to these criticisms, as it gives priority to one school of interpretation over the other. As Shafi and Hanafi schools are the dominant schools of interpretation in South Africa, the legislation tends to exclude Shia practices and certain practices that are particular to the Maliki and Hanbali schools of interpretation. In the interviews conducted, some people argued that in choosing one dominant or preferred school of interpretation, the state is mandating what religious practices should be. This argument also raised the broader questions of whether a secular state has the authority to define religious mandates, and also whether this amounts to a violation of freedom of religion. 
4) South Africa's International Law Obligations
This section will examine the United Nations system of international human rights law and the African regional systems of human rights law. recognized by the community shall be the duty of the State" (emphasis added).
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(e) Article 18(3) requires states to eliminate "every discrimination against women"
(emphasis added) and to protect women's rights "as stipulated in international declarations and conventions". In this way, the African Charter emphasizes women's rights by referring to pertinent international law, such as the ICCPR and CEDAW.
(f) Article 19 states that "All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another."
(g) Article 20 refers to the "unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination." At first glance, the question that arises is whether the peoples referred to signify groups determined by nationality (e.g., South Africans) or race, ethnicity, culture, or religion (e.g., Muslims).
(h) Article 23, however, suggests that the former interpretation (i.e. national group) is closer to the truth when it says that "All peoples shall have the right to national and international peace and security." Thus, these various provisions in the Maputo Protocol demonstrate -some more clearly than others -an ultimate recognition that where the individual rights of women collide with the cultural or religious rights of a group, it is the former that must be given special protection.
The African Court on Human Rights, a judicial mechanism of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, is also empowered to apply the African Charter and also any other human rights treaty or convention ratified by the state parties. Thus provisions in both the Maputo Protocol and the African charter enable the both the domestic and the regional courts to draw on a broader pool of norms protecting human, and more particularly in this case, women's human rights.
5) Relevant Constitutional Provisions
As stated previously, the South African Constitution should be interpreted in light of its does, it clarifies that such legislation is subject to all other rights, including the equality right.
Section 31 creates a similar limitation. It mandates that "Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community to (a) enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language." Despite this strong proclamation, the section goes on to state that these rights "… may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights." 34 In contrast, the equality clauses contain no such internal limitation, or 'but' clause.
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 35 is not simply relevant law, but also evidence of how the South African legislature interprets its own constitutional mandate. The guiding principle it stresses is the eradication of systemic racial and gender discrimination and inequality, which was injected into South African politics, economy, society, and psyche by an ill-famed triumvirate: colonialism, apartheid, and patriarchy. 36 Chapter 2, section 8 of the Act is devoted to clarifying the contours of gender discrimination. As such, it outlaws "… any practice, including traditional, customary or religious practice, which impairs the dignity of women and undermines equality between women and men."
37
In adopting legislation to recognize Muslim marriages, balancing the rights of women and the rights of religious groups is at the heart of staying true to the Constitution and overcoming the history of discrimination. As indicated earlier, where these foundational rights collide, the equality of women must take precedence. The recognition of Muslim marriages on a par with all other religious marriages is not precluded. But cultural and religious rights, unlike equality rights, are subject to limitations described above, as well as the general limitations clause in section 36 of the Constitution. So, in determining the scope of the right to religion and the right to equality, it is the former which may not be read so as to infringe on the equality right, especially since non-sexism is one of the foundational values of the Republic of South Africa. Finally, as Wayne van der Meide has argued, "[A]lthough culture is practiced within and defined in reference to a group, in the Bill of Rights it is an individual, not a collective, right. Generally, therefore, the right to culture cannot be used to protect the interests of a group at the expense of the rights to equality, non-discrimination and inherent human dignity of individuals." 
6) Relevant Jurisprudence
The right to equality has been widely explored by South Africa's courts. The Constitutional Court set out an equality test in Harksen v. Lane NO and Others, 39 which mandated that any discrimination on the grounds of gender, race, ethnic origin, religion, disability and other grounds enumerated in the s9 of the constitution, is considered to be unconstitutional. The
Court recognized both, past historical discrimination women faced in marriages in South Africa and also current experiences of women in relation to matrimonial property and the division of labor within the household, and how these factors compounded and further entrenched deep inequalities between women and men. While the test developed in the Harksen case certainly gives guidelines for determining absolute breaches of equality, it does not help to determine the balancing that must be done between gender and religious equality.
In Bhe and Others v the Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others, 40 the Constitutional Court resolved a conflict between African customary law and individual rights. In examining the rule of male primogeniture, which prohibited and discriminated against women's right to inherit property, the Court held that the customary law of succession, based largely on primogeniture, discriminates unfairly against women, both on the grounds of race and gender.
This case supports the conclusion that when a conflict of rights arises, the right to gender equality takes precedence over cultural and religious rights. contrary to public policy etc. 41 As we observe in the cases below, the courts have recognized the importance that religion has in this society, but have refused to use religious doctrine to interpret the constitution.
Ryland v. Edros
42 is a seminal example of the different approach to Muslim marriages adopted by the courts, when faced with an action for claims arising out of a marriage which was dissolved by Muslim Personal Laws. The Court asserted that the Constitution's values prohibited the imposition of a dominant community's preferences and prejudices (in this case prejudice against Muslim polygynous marriages) in a plural society like South Africa. 43 At first glance, this might seem to support the argument that liberal/secular preferences for gender equality could not be imposed on the Muslim community. However, it is important to note that the Ryland decision was based on constitutional values, one of which is non-sexism.
Thus, the Ryland case points towards the conclusion that the right to religious freedom emanates from the Constitution itself and, thus, religious freedom cannot be pursued without due regard to other central constitutional values, such as gender equality. 44 was a case related to compensation for the loss of support suffered as a consequence of the death of her husband in a car accident.
Amod v. Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund
The respondent had refused to pay compensation because Islamic marriages were not lawful at common law, since they were seen as contrary to good public policy, as they allowed for the practice of polygamy [polygyny] . 45 The Court, in giving recognition to the duty of support owed to the appellant, recognized the existence of a de facto monogamous Muslim marriage.
In Daniels v. Campbell NO and others 46 the Constitutional Court held that persons married according to Muslim rites were spouses for the purposes of inheritance where the deceased died without leaving a will. The court held further that the exclusion of people married under Muslim rites from the protection of the legislation in question is clearly an unjustifiably discriminatory remnant from the apartheid era. The common factor in the abovementioned cases was that in all instances the court was prepared to provide some remedy, but at the same time the court has consistently refused to recognize the legal status of marriages which are concluded under Muslim rites.
In addition, the recent Minister of Home Affairs and Another v. Fourie and Another 47 decision
on same-sex marriages asserted that the compass by which the 'right to marry' cases are decided should be South Africa's modern equality jurisprudence -which has focused on the values of human dignity, equality and freedom -rather than religious texts. 48 The court declared, "[I]t is one thing for the Court to acknowledge the important role that religion plays in our public life. It is quite another to use religious doctrine as a source for interpreting the Constitution. It would be out of order to employ the religious sentiments of some as a guide to the constitutional rights of others." 49 The Fourie case lends strong support to the contention that, in the marriage context, religious norms cannot outweigh the constitutionally-protected right to equality, and hence the inability of parties to lawfully marry their same sex partners constitutes discrimination. In summing up the jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has expanded the concept of marriage from a union of one man and one woman, to include same sex marriages; but it has also declined to recognize the legal validity of marriages conducted under the tenets of Muslim Laws.
The Constitutional Court has also faced another freedom of religion issue, i.e. whether giving special recognition to one religious group is unfair to other religious groups that lack such special recognition. In S v. Solberg 50 , the majority held that state endorsement of a particular religion would not infringe on the right to freedom of religion, as long as the endorsement did not have a coercive effect. However, Justice O'Regan strongly dissented, and argued that any such endorsement would not be permitted in South Africa's new constitutional order. 51 An important issue that Solberg raises in the Muslim marriages context is whether the SALRC draft bill creates 'coercive effects'. As will be outlined in the section below, one may well argue that the SALRC draft bill does this, insofar as it gives preferential treatment to some Islamic schools of interpretation over others and reinforces women's lesser socioeconomic status and autonomy, especially with regard to making religious and marital choices. There is additional case law on the legal treatment of the right to freedom of religion, but not specifically on the issue of Muslim marriages. Due to the constraints of space, such cases will not be discussed here.
7) Some implications of the SALRC and CGE Approaches
The SALRC draft bill (Muslim Marriages Act) and the CGE draft bill (Recognition of Religious Marriages Bill) take vastly different approaches to giving Muslim marriages legal status. Although several potential constitutional violations emerge from both proposed statutes, they will not all be addressed in this report. 52 The views expressed by interviewees will be utilized in the discussion of a few provisions of both bills, including the scope of application; concerns arising due to codification of religious law; and, potential violation of women's equality rights. 53 The report will address potential problems that focus on the provisions relating to divorce, matrimonial property regimes and maintenance.
7.1) Scope of Application
The SALRC bill applies only to Muslim marriages while the CGE bill applies to all religious marriages. The interviews reveal that some people are concerned that it is not fair to provide recognition of the tenets of one religious group and not to others. Other people argued that such recognition is patronizing to Muslims, as other religious groups are left to regulate themselves. 54 The CGE bill may be seen to remedy this criticism as it seeks to recognize all religious marriages, rather than to codify specific elements of any religious laws. 
7.2) Some Implications of the Codification Approach
It is important to firstly explore why the SALRC took the codification approach. The SALRC looked to the Constitution for legal support of codification of Muslim personal law. 56 Section 15 of the Constitution opens the door by allowing for legislation recognizing systems of personal and family law under any tradition or adhered to by persons professing a particular religion -although any such legislation must be consistent with the rest of the Constitution.
Also, the argument asserted in the SALRC Discussion Paper 101 was that Muslims currently had difficulty enforcing maintenance, termination of marriage, proprietary, and custody rights arising from their marriages and, thus, legislation must be specifically aimed at correcting these practical problems. The assertion was that women and children would be protected by specified substantive regulations. 57 Of those interviewed, many people generally maintained that religious leaders had a strong influence over the SALRC Project Committee on the draft bill and that these leaders generally supported codification. One example cited, as common knowledge amongst many people in the Muslim community, was that the SALRC adopted the Muslim judge requirement in response to calls from religious (ulama) bodies.
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Thus, codification was asserted by the SALRC as a way to actively provide social protection in marital and family problems. The sections below will outline how the codification approach utilized in this bill has, in fact, accomplished the exact opposite of this goal, instead putting women and children at a greater disadvantage, both inter-groups and intra-groups.
Many of these provisions are onerous in terms of a burden of proof; and they also presuppose access to knowledge and an equal power of parties to negotiate mutually favorable terms. The codification of religious laws approach focuses on protecting the religious group, with the emphasis being on formalizing group norms and institutions. In contrast, the recognition of religious marriages approach focuses on protecting the rights of the religious individual, with the emphasis being on personal choice of forum. Because individuals, especially women, are often subjugated even within protected minority groups, and because the individual is the lowest common denominator of both individual and group rights there is a greater imperative to protect individuals.
The SALRC bill seeks to codify elements of Muslim Personal Laws via the legislation itself and via the jurisprudence of Muslim judges and assessors. For example, it outlines rules for several marital situations relating to divorce practices such as talaq and khula 59 and postdivorce practices such as iddah. 60 In addition, this bill also prescribes that cases be tried by Muslim judges and assessors who have special knowledge of Islamic law. Many problems arise from this approach. At one level the concerns raised over codification of religious laws reflect a broader concern that the practices of many religious laws, including Muslim Personal Laws, are biased against women. The SALRC bill gives religious leaders greater discretion and authority, especially by mandating that Muslim judges and institutions play a central role in dispute resolution. This allows for the application of a variety of interpretations of religious laws, potentially in a biased manner.
During interviews, some interviewees stated that the SALRC chose elements of Muslim Personal Laws in a piecemeal manner, picking and choosing from the four main schools of thought without regard to internal consistency or religious authenticity. Also, it was argued that by doing this, the state is attempting to legislate on the fundamentals of religious laws.
This raises the broader question of whether the state has the authority to define religious mandates. Some also argued that the very act of crystallizing a specific set of religious rules in a piece of legislation goes against religious freedom and integrity, because religious tenets evolve and change over time and in different contexts. 61 Many interviewees criticized the SALRC's process of consultation when drafting the bill, noting that women's voices were not adequately represented. 62 Furthermore, the bill has raised dissent amongst Muslim scholars, with many holding that it violates freedom of religion by prescribing religious practices under coerciveness of state sanctions, and that it also infringes the autonomy of religious institutions. 63 It is argued that the Constitution of South Africa provides for the separation of It is important to note the limitations of the recognition of religious marriages approach.
Because recognition leaves the private religious sphere unfettered, it leaves unfixed many of the underlying biases against women, on the part of religious leaders and institutions, just as codification goes too far in the other direction by lending state approval to these biased actors and institutions. This tension results in the conclusion that laws are not a panacea for dealing with violations of women's human rights arising out of religious practices and that other remedies must also be pursued. Another limitation is that the CGE bill effectively forces women to choose between an exclusive religious option and a secular option, whereas the SALRC bill seems to have some moderating effect through the appeals process. Also, in theory women have a choice of forum, but in practice this is not the case, as threats/coercion/fear etc may prevent them choosing the secular realm even if they wanted to.
7.3) Potential Violations of Women's Equality Rights
The SALRC bill provisions on divorce reveal a lack of clarity, disparate levels of power granted to male spouses (i.e. the entrenchment of legal inequality), and also a failure to pursue the substantive equality of women. For example, section 9(2) of the SALRC Bill provides that a court may terminate a Muslim marriage on any ground permitted by Islamic law. Yet, the bill fails to identify any of these grounds and thus opens the door to gender-biased interpretations of religious grounds. The CGE bill, on the other hand, simplifies and equalizes rights in divorce. It states that only a court may dissolve a marriage and the civil law standard of 'irretrievable breakdown' is sufficient ground for dissolution purposes.
Unfortunately, the CGE bill also makes reference to ensuring that the marriage is dissolved according to religious tenets, prior to a court process of dissolution. The implications here include: having to deal with conservative religious institutions, bargaining in the shadow of the law with recalcitrant husbands, delayed processes etc. Also, the SALRC Bill, in codifying different forms of divorce and post-divorce practices, openly spells out and formalizes inequality in the law by giving the husband greater freedom to end the marriage. This is a violation of both domestic and international laws. One example is a provision on divorce which prohibits remarriage, for a mandatory waiting period of 130 days for a woman who is not pregnant and until the time of delivery for a woman who is pregnant (i.e. the iddah period).
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The process of dissolution of marriages under the SALRC Bill is another example of the different treatment in respect of divorce processes accorded to the Muslim community as compared to both civil law and customary law divorces. Under the SALRC bill, compulsory mediation is the first step in the process of dispute resolution. This can be followed by arbitration, and finally litigation if the matter is not resolved. Court proceedings will have to be presided over by a Muslim judge. Failing the existence of a Muslim judge in that Court, the matter will have to be heard by a Muslim attorney (who would be designated as an actingjudge Numerous problems are evident in this approach. First, in court cases, the application of Islamic laws could introduce gender bias into both the procedure and substance of the case.
Second, as noted earlier, by creating a special role for Muslim judges and attorneys as judicial officers, the SALRC bill may convey existing distributional problems into the courtroom.
Third, because this bill mandates compulsory mediation, only Muslim people would be made to go through this additional procedural 'hoop' in order to gain access to the formal justice system. This puts Muslims at a disadvantage vis-à-vis non-Muslims with regard to their constitutionally protected right to have access to both due process and effective justice.
Fourth, because arbitration is a private process, there is concern that gender bias will proceed unchecked by public scrutiny. Studies have found that private bargaining in family law tends to yield inferior results for many women. 68 The CGE bill does not stipulate the appointment of religious judges, nor does it mandate compulsory mediation prior to adjudication processes for divorce. Hence, any underlying gender biases in the religious norms are further entrenched by the SALRC Bill, but neither are they fully confronted by the CGE Bill.
In the SALRC bill, the default position in respect of matrimonial property regimes for Muslim marriages is, as marriages out of community of property, excluding the accrual system. This is in contrast to the default system in both the civil law, i.e. the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 and also, the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, which provide for a default system of 'in community of property'. The SALRC bill provides that each spouse maintains his or her own estate and any growth accrued during the marriage will not be split between the two. This can be modified by a pre-nuptial contract, prior to the marriage ceremony. These provisions could serve to disadvantage women as male spouses can often more easily acquire hard assets during a marriage, while women may contribute more intangibly to family resources. Given the backdrop of existing gender inequality in terms of socio-economic resources, women are less able to assert their interests and demand an antenuptial contract. Also, under this bill, an application by the husband to enter into a subsequent marriage, may lead to the court dividing or terminating, an existing matrimonial property system. On the other hand, the CGE bill asserts that marriages will be governed by the tenets of the parties' religion. Although, this offers more room for the application of more equitable rules by the parties, by leaving the issues of proprietary consequences to the tenets of the religion, women in Muslim marriages are not protected from biased religious norms.
In terms of maintenance, the SALRC bill mandates that a husband supports his wife during marriage and for a limited period post-divorce (the iddah period) 69 , and that he pays child support to her upon divorce, but it has no provision for the payment of alimony. In contrast, the CGE bill would invoke the provisions of laws of general application that apply to marriage, divorce and maintenance. This is especially important since realistically in South Africa, many women traditionally labor in an unpaid or informal sector of the economy i.e.
largely maintaining the household and caring for children. Furthermore, because of the historical legacy of a denial of education opportunities for non-white [black/people of color]
people, women often lack the education and training required to later enter the work force if necessary. Hence, the lack of an equitable matrimonial system and a provision for alimony threatens to leave many women in financial jeopardy, if not utter destitution. As a result, this omission unfairly discriminates against women, both formally and substantively, de jure and de facto. The SALRC bill serves to further entrench inequality in South African law between
Muslim and non-Muslim women.
8) Conclusion
It is acknowledged that law is only one part of any solution relating the achievement of women's human rights and substantive gender equality. Law is not a panacea for underlying social inequities, both structural and systemic. It will ultimately be up to South Africans to Many country experiences demonstrate that codification of Muslim Personal Laws poses constitutional as well as religious law challenges. These challenges raise questions for states engaging in this process, to reconsider and revisit codification as the approach to recognition of religious laws. Such experiences also emphasize the highly delicate subject of accommodation in the family law arena, including essential problems underlying the current theoretical and legal models for dividing jurisdiction over individuals with multiple affiliations. In the South African multicultural context, the issue of recognition of Muslim marriages is of concern to its very plural fabric. Hence, its approach to multiculturalism is decisive to both its secularist and pluralist identity. The situation South Africa is faced with now demands a closer look at the different models of multiculturalism various countries have followed, and also the impact of their approaches in the recognition of Muslim Personal
Laws. The South African context requires institutional scrutiny that can appreciate the situational complexity faced by individuals who are culturally and legally tied to both the group and the state. The challenge is balancing equality rights and the right to religion. From a social science perspective -from the perspective of life as it is lived as opposed to law as it is written -a codification bill, such as the SALRC bill, will be harmful to women even when it appears neutral, such as when it allows women to enter anti-nuptial contracts to change the matrimonial regime. The reality in South Africa is that women are generally of a lower socioeconomic status than men; hence it is highly unlikely that they will be able to truly use such provisions to protect their interests. Turning a blind eye to such realities promotes and perpetuates the social inequalities the Constitution was designed to address. The problem that has been identified is that of non-recognition of religious marriages. This is a problem that is faced by the Muslim community as well as other religious communities. The legislative solution that is required is one of recognizing religious marriages, while avoiding codifying any particular religion.
